7 Epistemological Approaches

1. Informative (Revelational)
2. Inductive (Empirical)
3. Indefinitive (Skeptical)
4. Interpretive (Hermeneutical)
5. Integrative (Synthetical)
6. Inferential (Rational)
7. Intuitive (Mystical)

© Domenic Marbaniang, 2000, 2012.

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